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Abstract
This  dissertation,  written  as  part  of  the  “LLM  in  Transnational  and  European
Commercial  Law,  Mediation,  Arbitration  and  Energy  Law”  at  International  Hellenic
University, addresses the right of states to regulate in the international investment law
regime.  The  thesis  focuses  on  the  foreign  investors'  and  host  states'  conflicting
interests. Foreign investors have a strong interest in the stability of the favorable legal
and political framework of the host state where they chose to invest. On the other
hand, host states want to reserve a degree of flexibility in order to protect their vital
domestic interests and adapt their policies to changing circumstances. Achieving an
appropriate balance between these two conflicting interests constitutes the principal
challenge for modern international investment law. Until recently IIAs, particularly BITs,
were  characterized  by  a  strong  asymmetry  focusing  almost  entirely  on  foreign
investment  promotion  and protection while  remaining  silent  with  regard  to  states'
public interests. In this context, a notable trend has emerged over the last few years
towards  safeguarding  the  right  of  states  to  regulate  with  the  aim  to  remedy  this
imbalance. This thesis examines how this trend is reflected in more recent IIAs and the
innovations introduced by them for this purpose. Moreover, with the support of the
case law of ICSID, the leading arbitration institution for the settlement of investment
disputes, this work attempts to establish clear rules for the distinction between indirect
expropriations of foreign investments requiring compensation and non-compensable
governmental measures adopted for the pursuance of states' legitimate public welfare
objectives.  To  this  end,  special  attention  is  paid  on  the  so  called  “police  powers
doctrine”, inserting an exception to the general rule that compensation must be paid
for expropriation. The thesis ends with some recommendations for the reform of the
IIA regime in light of UNCTAD's recent initiatives in this regard, so as to enhance the
right of states to regulate in the public interest while maintaining favorable investment
conditions, ultimately reflecting the interests of all stakeholders.
Keywords: right to regulate, investors' risks, indirect expropriation, police powers, IIA
reform. 
4
Preface
As an LLM student at International Hellenic University in the year 2015-2016 I had the
opportunity to discover several new areas of law. One of the fields that mostly drew my
attention was that of Arbitration and particularly of Investment Arbitration, a method
of  alternative  dispute  resolution  for  the  settlement  of  investment  disputes,  not
commonly  used  and  sometimes  even  unknown  in  my  country,  Greece.  I  consider
myself  privileged  for  having  had  the  chance  to  meet  Professor  Friedrich  Jakob
Rosenfeld whose intellectually stimulating lectures inspired me to write a dissertation
on this  particular  subject in order to fulfill  my graduation requirements.  This  study
introduced me to a whole new fascinating world and gave me the opportunity to deal
thoroughly  with  a  lasting  and  controversial  issue  in  international  investment  law,
namely  the  need  to  search  for  an  appropriate  balance  between  foreign  investors'
private interests on the basis of several IIAs and host states' public interests in pursuing
legitimate public welfare objectives. I hope that this thesis will shed some light to this
thorny  issue  by  highlighting  some  recent  trends  and  initiatives  emerging  both  in
arbitral practice and in the context of modern IIAs and will  serve as a useful guide
towards a more balanced international investment law regime. 
This dissertation is original, unpublished, independent work by the author. 
Christina Louizaki
January 2017
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Introduction
The conclusion of the first bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”) between Germany and
Pakistan in 1959, marked the beginning of a long period in which the promotion and
protection of investments has been the main concern of states.1 Soon from an early
stage, it was realized that foreign direct investment possesses a central role with regard
to a state's  economic growth,  development and internal  prosperity.  Indeed, foreign
direct investment (“FDI“) has a particular significance not only from an economic, but
also from a social and political perspective.2 It enables the transfer of knowledge and
updated technology and therefore facilitates the creation of new and better paying
jobs.  It  also  contributes  to  the  infusion  of  capital  and  enhances  people's  living
conditions  by  improving  infrastructure,  education  and  health  standards.
Simultaneously,  it  helps  building  strategic  relationships  with  host  countries  and
establishing  a  strong  and  competitive  position  within  the  global  economy,  which
further enables a more efficient approach of pressing global challenges like poverty
and  environmental  issues.3 All  these  benefits  explain  why  FDI  has  often  been
characterized as  “the lifeblood of the global economy”,4“an essential component for
sustainable development”5 and “a prerequisite for social and economic growth”.6 
It  is  thus  no  surprise  that  states  have  continuously  sought  to  attract  foreign
investments  by  creating an investor-friendly  climate within  their  territories.7 In  this
context, states have substantially circumscribed their regulatory powers in a number of
sensitive areas relating to public order, national security, social and cultural policy and
economic policy for sustainable development, as well as to fundamental human rights
and the environment.8 This  restriction of policy space is  clearly reflected in a huge
number of international investment agreements (“IIAs”) and particularly in BITs, which
1 A. Titi, The Right to Regulate in International Investment Law, 1st edn, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2014, p. 19.
2 L.E. Trakman and N.W. Ranieri, Regionalism in International Investment Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 9.
3 M.  Herdegen,  Principles  of  International  Economic Law,  1st edn,  Oxford,  Oxford University  Press,  2013, p.  35; L.W Mouyal,
International Investment Law and the Right to Regulate- A Human Rights Perspective, New York, Routledge, 2016, p. 7; Trakman
and Ranieri, supra n. 2, pp 1,4; C. Pickard,  International Investment Law: Some Cultural Legal Insights,  in: L.E. Trakman and N.W.
Ranieri (eds), Regionalism in International Investment Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 28.
4 N.W. Ranieri, NAFTA: An Overview, in L.E. Trakman and N.W. Ranieri (eds), Regionalism in International Investment Law, New York,
Oxford University Press, 2013, p.89.
5 H.  Mann,  'The  Right  of  States  to  Regulate  and  International  Investment  Law:  A  Comment',  in  UNCTAD  The  Development
Dimension of FDI: Policy and Rule-Making Perspectives, New York and Geneva, United Nations Publication, 2003, p. 212.
6 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 6.
7 K.P Sauvant, Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2008-2009, New York, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 217.
8 Titi, supra n. 1, p. 19.
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constitute the biggest part of IIAs.9 In fact, IIAs have been criticized as being “a charter
of  rights  for  foreign  investors  with  no  concomitant  responsibilities  or  liabilities,  no
direct legal links to promoting development objectives, and no protection for the public
welfare in the face of environmentally or socially destabilizing foreign investment”10 and
as “short documents single-mindedly focused on investment protection and displaying
stubborn laconism where the public interest is concerned”.11 
In the meantime, the ever-increasing conclusion of  BITs,  which by the end of 2015
reached the impressive number of 2946,12 reinforced the already existing concern that
states' public policy is excessively confined.13 The unbalanced system of BITs focusing
almost  entirely  on the protection of  investors and their  investments,14 gave rise  to
significant tensions, which can be effectively summarized under the term  “stability-
flexibility dilemma”.15 On the one hand, economic and regulatory stability of the host
state  constitutes  a  determinative factor  for  the investor's  decision to invest  in  this
particular state. Given the fact that investments often involve long-term projects and
enormous capital flows, the investor is highly interested in the maintenance of the host
state's existed legal and political framework in order not to be arbitrarily displaced by
new, intrusive, domestic policies.16 On the other hand, states need to reserve policy
space to promote their national development, to protect their vital domestic interests,
such as national security and cultural identity and to conform to their human rights
commitments,  while  simultaneously  being  able  to  adapt  their  policies  to  changing
circumstances. In this respect, states also need to preserve a degree of discretion to
regulate foreign investments for the national good. Flexibility is therefore a key aspect
for a state's sustainable development and social welfare.17 
This  continuing  conflict  between  states'  public  interests  and  investors'  legitimate
private interests, constitutes a lasting issue in international investment law, which stirs
9 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 4.
10 Mann, supra n. 5, p. 212. 
11 C. Titi, 'EU investment agreements and the search for a new balance: A paradigm shift from laissez-faire liberalism toward
embedded liberalism?', No.86, Columbia FDI Perspectives, 2013, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_86.pdf, (accessed 30
October 2016).
12 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2016- Investor Nationality: Policy Challenges, Geneva, United Nations Publication, 2016, p.
101.
13 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p.17.
14 A. Kulick,  Global Public Interest in International Investment Law,  New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 1; Mouyal,
supra n. 3, p 18. 
15 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 19.
16 Ibid., p. 19; Trakman and Ranieri, supra n. 2, p. xvii.
17 Sauvant, supra n. 7, pp. 233- 234; Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 19; Trakman and Ranieri, supra n. 2, pp. xiv, xvii. 
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passions and creates much controversy within host states.18 These challenges have led
many states over the last few years to take a different path towards the protection of
their right to regulate in the public interest. Indeed, the termination of various BITs,19
the coordination to phase out existing intra-EU BITs,20 the several model BIT reviews
asserting regulatory space,21 the various ECT terminations,22 the exclusion of investor-
state arbitration from some IIAs,23 the negotiation of comprehensive treaties including
investment chapters24 and many other recent changes, indicate a renewed interest in
the right to regulate25 and the need for states to search for a new balance,26 where the
“one-sided offer of protection to investors...ceases to be the default mode”.27
Against this background, the present thesis addresses the topic of the right of states to
regulate in the context of the international investment law regime. The purpose of this
work is  to  examine the nature and scope of  the right  to regulate and indicate the
increasing importance it has gained through the years in an attempt to create a more
balanced international investment system. This study will also strive to give answers to
some  lasting  and  controversial  issues  such  as  the  distinction  between  indirect
expropriations  and non-compensable  governmental  measures  for  the promotion of
legitimate public welfare objectives, account being taken of the recent ICSID case law
and modern IIAs. Moreover, it will highlight the trend towards a new generation of IIAs
which balances investor protection with regulation, that slowly but steadily appears to
be taking root. 
Structurally,  this  thesis  is  divided  into  three  Chapters.  Chapter  one  deals  with  the
concept  of  the  right  to  regulate  in  the  context  of  state  sovereignty,  the  risks  that
investors  generally  face when investing in  a  foreign country and the risk-mitigating
18 Herdegen, supra n. 3, p. 354; Pickard, supra n. 3, p. 34.
19 See for example the termination in 2015 of 8 Indonesian BITs with Bulgaria, China, France, Italy, the Lao People's Democratic
Republic, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Slovakia; UNCTAD, supra n. 12, p. 102.
20 See for example the delegations from Austria, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands submitting a non-paper in April
2016 proposing the conclusion of an agreement among all EU member States in order to coordinate the phasing out of existing
intra-EU BITs; UNCTAD, supra n. 12, p. 102.
21 See for example the 2012 US Model BIT which was born out of such a review; Titi, supra n. 1, p. 25.
22 See for example Russia's termination of its provisional application of the Energy Charter Treaty and Italy's withdrawal from the
Energy Charter Treaty notified in December 2014 and taking effect in January 2016; Titi, supra n. 1, p. 23; UNCTAD, supra n. 12, p.
103. 
23 See for example the decision of the Australian Gillard Government to discontinue an essential investor protection mechanism in
its future agreements by excluding investor-state arbitration; Titi, supra n. 1, p. 25.
24 See for example the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP); Titi, supra n. 1, p. 22.
25 Titi, supra n. 1, pp. 22-23.
26 For instance, the US, Canadian and Norwegian model treaties have already sought to achieve such a balance by showing some
sympathy to non-investment issues throughout the past decade; Kulick, supra n. 14, pp. 69-76; M. Sornarajah, The International
Law on Foreign Investment, 3rd edn, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 235; Titi, supra n. 11, p. 1.
27 Titi, supra n. 1, p. 21.
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tools among which BITs hold a leading position (see 1.). Chapter two examines the right
to regulate in relation to expropriation. It develops some indicative factors emerging
from both BITs and arbitral practice for the determination of indirect expropriations
and sets the conditions for their lawfulness. Particular emphasis is placed on the so-
called  “police  powers  doctrine” inserting  an  exception  to  the  general  rule  that
compensation must be paid for expropriation (see 2.). Chapter three provides some
recommendations for the reform of IIAs with a view to enhance the right of states to
regulate in light of UNCTAD's recent initiatives in connection with this right (see 3.). The
thesis ends with an assessment and an outlook (see “conclusions”.). These issues will
be discussed in further detail below. 
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1. The right to regulate, investors' risks and the law.
This  chapter  examines  the  notion  of  state  sovereignty  (see  1.1.)  and  the  right  to
regulate as an expression of state sovereignty (see 1.2.), the investors' challenges when
investing in a foreign country (see 1.3.) and the mechanisms for the protection of their
investments (see 1.4.).
1.1. The concept of state sovereignty.
“States are masters of and over their own territory”.28 This simple phrase encapsulates
the broad margin of appreciation that states enjoy with regard to the regulation of
their internal affairs. Indeed, states have the authority to exploit and dispose of their
territory  according  to  their  will  and  without  external  interventions.  They  have  full
jurisdiction over their territory, which is translated as power to enact new laws and
ensure their observance, as well as power to settle the legal disputes arising within
their borders. All  these significant powers make up the notion of  state sovereignty,
which  is  clearly  reflected  in  the  Charter  of  Economic  Rights  and  Duties  of  States,
according to which: “Every State has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its
economic system as well as its political, social and cultural systems in accordance with
the will of its people, without outside interference, coercion, or threat whatsoever”.29 
In this context, states hold the right not only to admit or reject foreign investments, but
also to set conditions to their entry or regulate their activity and further determine if
and to what extent they may provide investment protection.30 Besides, countries often
tend to restrict FDI in strategic sectors such as the arms industry, energy supply or
telecommunications, on national security grounds.31 Moreover, states may negotiate
and conclude treaties  such as  BITs,  so  as  to  set  the rules  that  will  govern  foreign
investments, according to their economic and financial objectives.32 Thus they are free
to  regulate  their  economy and in  this  respect,  they  may also take actions such  as
28 Herdegen, supra n. 3, p. 65.
29 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, UNGA resolution 3281 (XXIX), 1974, article 1; See also Mouyal, supra n. 3, p.31;
Herdegen, supra n. 3, pp. 65, 68.
30 A.J.  Bret, 'Admission and Establishment in the Context of Investment Protection', in: A.  Reinisch,  Standards of Investment
Protection, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 10; Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 32.
31 A. Viterbo,  International Economic Law and Monetary Measures- Limitations to States' Sovereignty and Dispute Settlement,
Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar, 2012, p. 238; Herdegen, supra n. 3, p. 357.
32 R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer,  Principles of International Investment Law,  New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 7; Mouyal,
supra n. 3, pp. 32, 223.
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exchange  restrictions  and  capital  controls  to  address  serious  balance  of  payment
crises.33 Additionally, state sovereignty entails the states' right to define their priorities
and objectives according to their  territorial  needs.  The promotion of  social  welfare
regulation might for example be the core objective in a specific period of time and
states  may  freely  choose  the  appropriate  means  to  pursue  this  goal,  even  to  the
detriment of other areas, however always with respect to human life and property as
the foundations of state sovereignty.34 
Nevertheless, state sovereignty is not absolute. Instead, it is restricted from both the
principle of sovereign equality of states and the commitments undertaken by the states
through several agreements and treaties.35 In particular, all  states coexist within the
international community and have equal rights and duties irrespective of the possible
social,  political  economic or other differences that may occur between them. Every
state should thus respect other states' sovereignty and accept limitations that might be
imposed to them in this respect.36 Apart from that, states often voluntarily surrender
part  of  their  rights  by  concluding  IIAs  such  as  BITs.  Besides,  the  commitments
undertaken by such agreements must be kept according to the principle of pacta sunt
servanda,37 otherwise their breach will cause state responsibility.38 As underlined in the
famous  SS  Wimbledon case  though,  “The  right  to  entering  into  international
engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty” and should not in fact be seen as “an
abandonment of its sovereignty”.39
Consequently, it is clear that states as national sovereigns are free to make their own
choices, while as international sovereigns are confined by the principle of sovereign
equality of states and the potential commitments undertaken through the conclusion
of various treaties.40
1.2. The right to regulate.
Against this background, the right to regulate turns out to be nothing more than an
“affirmation  of  the  sovereign  right  for  states  to  choose  their  political,  social  and
33 Viterbo, supra n. 31, pp. 249, 275.
34 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 32.
35 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
36 Ibid., p. 33; Herdegen, supra n. 3, p. 66.
37 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, article 26.
38 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 34; Sornarajah, supra n. 26, p. 88. 
39 S.S. Wimbledon (U.K. v. Germ.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 1 (June 28), at IV The Law, para. 35.
40 Mouyal, supra n. 3, pp. 34-35.
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economic  priorities...through  the  adoption  of  legislation  and  administrative
practices….”.41 It signifies the freedom of states to adopt regulation in order to protect
public order, morals, health, safety and the environment and engage in any activities
necessary to promote their primary interests or needs, provided that the measures
adopted are not “grossly unfair, unjust, idiosyncratic or discriminatory”.42 
However, as with state sovereignty, the right to regulate is not unlimited. Instead it is
circumscribed  by  international  law  and  particularly  by  the  various  commitments
undertaken through IIAs. Assuming an international obligation, though, does not mean
that the state loses its ability to regulate. To the contrary, the enhanced significance of
this right lies primarily on the fact that it is a “legal right exceptionally permitting the
host state to regulate in derogation of international commitments it has undertaken by
means  of  an  investment  agreement  without  incurring  a  duty  to  compensate”.43
Therefore, a state retains its capacity to terminate a treaty or call off its obligations and
even without fulfilling the compensation requirement, as long as it proves to have a
genuine right to regulate. Although this latter view is not universally accepted, as it has
been successfully submitted in Feldman case, “governments must be free to act in the
broader public interest”  and  “Reasonable  governmental  regulation...  cannot  be
achieved if any business that is adversely affected may seek compensation...”.44 
The significance of the states' right to regulate and the role that the latter is called to
play  have  become  much  more  apparent  over  the  last  few  years.  The  impressive
proliferation of BITs with their asymmetrical structure in favor of the investors and the
respective  excessive  obligations  imposed  exclusively  on  host  states,  as  well  as  the
increasing number of investor-state arbitrations, have caused severe tensions and a
serious  threat  to states'  regulatory interests.  In  this  context,  reserving a  degree of
policy  space  appears  to  be  a  prerequisite  for  regaining  equilibrium  and  achieving
stability.45 Accordingly,  there is an imperative need to enhance the right of states to
regulate and to start thinking of it as a right “inherent in the sovereignty of states and
41 Mouyal, supra n. 3, pp. 8-9.
42 Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/3, (Award, 30 April 2004), para. 98; See also A.
Newcombe, 'The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law', Vol. 20, No.1, ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law
Journal (2005), p. 1(28); Titi, supra n. 1, p. 32.
43 Titi, supra n. 1, p. 33.
44 Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, (Award 16 December 2002), para. 103; See also Titi, supra n. 1 pp. 32-
34.
45 T.T Pham, 'International investment treaties and arbitration as imbalanced instruments: a re-visit', Vol. 13, No. 3, International
Arbitration Law Review (2010), p. 81 (81). Available from: Westlaw UK, (accessed 30 October 2016); Titi, supra n. 1, pp. 67-68, 74.
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thus to be limited only in specific and clear circumstances”.46
1.3. Investors' risks.
Contrary to trade transactions which generally involve a one-time exchange of goods
and  money,  foreign  investments  constitute  long-term  relationships  between  the
investors  and  the  host  states.  Thus,  as  with  every  long-term  project,  there  are  a
number  of  risks  inherent  in  foreign  investments,  which  need  to  be  determined  in
advance in order to be dealt with effectively and be minimized to the extent possible.
Besides, their careful estimation may even have a great influence on the success of the
potential investment.47 
In fact, every investor is confronted with two kinds of risks: the commercial/business
risk  and  the  political  risk.  The  commercial  risk  is  related  to  the  market  of  the
investment  project  and  may  result  from  its  changing  economic  conditions.  Price
volatilities, new competitors, a simple breach of contract, a purchaser's unwillingness
or inability to pay, the displacement of a product by a new one or the failure of a
product or service to meet the requirements of the market, are examples of normal
business  risks  included in every investment project.  Commercial  risks  are  therefore
inescapable and every investor is fully aware of them and generally willing to bear
them.48 
On the other hand, the political risk arises from the host state's political decisions and
the changes it realizes with regard to its existing political framework.49 This risk may
appear in two main forms, namely in the form of turmoil and political violence within
the host state or in the form of onerous regulation due to subsequent alterations in the
host state's laws. Regarding the first one, it is clear that disturbances within a state
such  as  civil  unrest,  armed  conflicts,  destructions  and  the  concomitant  danger  of
governments  being  overturned,  create  significant  instability  and  insecurity  and
constitute a serious disincentive for investors to invest in this particular state, as well as
a threat for the activity and continuance of already existing investments.50
46 M. Sornarajah, 'Right to regulate and safeguards', in: UNCTAD  The Development Dimension of FDI: Policy and Rule-Making
Perspectives, New York and Geneva, United Nations Publication, 2003, p. 223.
47 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 7; Dolzer and Schreuer, supra n. 32, pp. 3-4.
48 Dolzer and Schreuer, supra n. 32, p. 4; C. Schreuer, 'Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice', Vol. 6, No. 3, The Journal
of World Investment & Trade (2005), 357 (380); Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 7; Newcombe, supra n. 42, p. 37.
49 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 7; Sornarajah, supra n. 26, p. 69.
50 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 7. 
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Particular attention in this thesis will be paid to the second form of political risk relating
to  onerous regulation which constitutes  foreign investors'  most  serious  risk.  In  the
context of their right to regulate and in order to conform to changing economic, social
and political circumstances, states often make deliberate changes in their laws which
may sometimes have detrimental effects to foreign investments. More precisely, they
may affect their ownership, ongoing activity and profitability or their existence itself.51
Actions  that  may  have  such  disastrous  effects  might,  for  instance,  be  related  to
unlawful expropriations, the imposition of exchange or capital controls and restrictions
on the repatriation of profits, as well as to unlawful discrimination and the failure to
provide adequate protection.52 Political risks take on an even greater dimension when
it  comes  to  long-term  investment  projects  involving  huge  capital  flows,  or  when
investing in developing countries which have insufficient mechanisms to deal with the
radical  changes affecting foreign investments.53 At  the same time, political  risks are
intensified  by  the  fact  that  investors  have  limited  or  no  bargaining  power  in  the
decisions that affect them, since they do not enjoy the political rights reserved to the
nationals of the respective host state.54 
Therefore, a state acting in its sovereign capacity may adopt regulation to promote
social  welfare  objectives,  which  though  may  have  an  adverse  effect  on  foreign
investments by altering the facts on which the investor's decision to invest as well as its
business plan were based.55 Political risk is thus “not a matter of whether the state will
impose new regulations or not but rather to what extent these actions will affect the
investment”.56 In this respect, there is an imperative need to address this risk instead of
ending up challenging even more measures in investment arbitration.57
1.4. Risk allocation mechanisms.
Over the last decades, the most effective means for addressing political risk has been
the  conclusion  of  IIAs.  Investment  treaties  are  international  economic  agreements
51 Ibid., p. 8.
52 R.D. Bishop, J. Crawford and W.M. Reisman, Foreign Investment Disputes- Cases, Materials and Commentary, The Hague, Kluwer
Law International, 2014, p. 13; P.R. Wood, Conflict of Laws and International Finance, 1st edn, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2007, p.
616.
53 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 10; Herdegen, supra n. 3, p. 375.
54 Newcombe, supra n. 42, p. 14.
55 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 10; Dolzer and Schreuer, supra n. 32, pp. 4.
56 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 8.
57 Ibid., p. 10.
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designed to provide protection and security to foreign investors,58 while  seeking to
attract more capital by creating investor-friendly conditions within the host states in
order to promote their social and economic growth.59 
Two  categories  of  IIAs  can  generally  be  identified,  i.e.  multilateral  and  bilateral
treaties.60 Despite  considerable  efforts  to  create  a  multilateral  treaty  dealing  with
international  investment  law  at  a  universal  level, this  has  not  been  achieved  yet,
something  which  is  often  attributed  to  the  divergence  of  views  as  to  the  proper
protection  and  treatment  of  foreign  investments.61 The  last  noteworthy,  though
unsuccessful attempt in this respect, has been the one by OECD in 1995 to negotiate a
Multilateral  Agreement  on  Investment  (“MAI”).62 Some  multilateral  agreements  do
exist however, covering investments in a specific geographical area.63 NAFTA, is such an
agreement between USA, Canada and Mexico dealing, among others, with investment
disputes arising among its parties.64 The ECT which covers most countries in Central
and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of  Independent States countries,  is  an
unusual multilateral treaty dealing with both international investment and trade in the
energy  sector.65 The ASEAN is  another  such  agreement  covering  much of  Asia  and
dealing with investments  pursued in  this  area by national  and companies  of  other
member states.66 Moreover, foreign investment provisions may be inserted into both
multilateral  and  bilateral  Free  Trade  Agreements  (FTAs),  which  also  address  trade
issues.67 At the European level, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 marked
the beginning of negotiations by the EU of several trade agreements with investment
chapters, such as CETA and TTIP.68
Due to the lack of consensus on a multilateral framework for investment protection,
states have turned to the conclusion of a huge number of BITs69 which nowadays have
become the  “primary modern investment regulatory regime”70 and  “one of the most
58 Trakman and Ranieri, supra n. 2, p. xiii. 
59 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 10. 
60 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
61 N. van den Broek, 'Protection of Investors in International Trade and Investment Regimes: A Practical Comparison', in: F.X.
Stirnimann, A. Romanetti and J.A. Huerta-Goldman (eds),  WTO Litigation, Investment Arbitration, and Commercial  Arbitration,
Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2013, p. 23.
62 Bishop, Crawford and Reisman, supra n. 52, p. 7.
63 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 11.
64 Bishop, Crawford and Reisman, supra n. 52, p. 756.
65 Ibid., pp. 9, 755.
66 Ibid., p. 9; Wood, supra n. 52, p. 646.
67 Dolzer and Schreuer, supra n. 32, p. 25; Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 11. 
68 Mouyal, supra n. 3, pp. 11-12; Herdegen, supra n. 3, p. 380.
69 Van den Broek, supra n. 61, p. 23.
70 Pickard, supra n. 3, p. 36.
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widely used tools for structuring economic relations between countries”.71 Indeed, BITs
are international contracts between two states which reciprocally agree to promote
and protect foreign investments originating from the other contracting party.72 This is
clearly reflected in the context of BITs requiring host states to provide investments with
specific standards of protection, namely: i) fair and equitable treatment (“FET”), ii) full
protection  and  security,  iii)  national  treatment,  iv)  most  favored  nation  (“MFN”)
treatment and treatment no less favorable than that required by international law, v)
non- discrimination, vi) guarantees of free transfer of funds and vii) compensation for
losses due to expropriation and similar measures, or due to war and civil riots. Most
BITs  further  include  the  possibility  to  refer  disputes  to  international  arbitration,
particularly under ICSID, or provide for investor-state dispute settlement through ad
hoc arbitration.73 Structurally BITs appear to be  “remarkably uniform”74 consisting of
the treaty's aims, the types of property covered by the treaty, the obligations imposed
on host states, but rarely on capital exporting states, the standards of expropriation,
compensation and currency transfer,  as  well  as  dispute resolution provisions.75 The
similar structure itself, however, does not suffice to create customary international law,
as  has  often been argued,  given the significant  differentiations in the substance of
these  treaties.76 Instead,  BITs  are  lex  specialis  as  between the  parties,77 thus,  they
supersede any inconsistent customary international law.78 Therefore they provide  “a
real measure of protection to investors”.79 
Consequently,  the  significance  of  IIAs,  and  especially  of  BITs,  is  undoubtedly
tremendous.80 Not  only  do  they  “protect  foreign  investors  against  outrageous  and
discriminatory conduct by host states”, but also enhance their rights “in a way that
shifts the risk of regulatory change from the investor to the government”.81
71 Bishop, Crawford and Reisman, supra n. 52, p. 42.
72 Wood, supra n. 52, p. 634.
73 Bishop, Crawford and Reisman, supra n. 52, p. 753; Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 11. 
74 K. Vandevelde, 'The political economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty', Vol. 92, No. 4,  The American Journal of International
Law (1998), 621 (628).
75 Van den Broek, supra n. 61, p. 23;  Bishop, Crawford and Reisman, supra n. 52, p. 753; Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 11; Sornarajah,
supra n. 26, pp. 187-188.
76 Sornarajah, supra n. 26, p. 81.
77 Ibid, p. 234.
78 Bishop, Crawford and Reisman, supra n. 52, p. 753.
79 Ibid, p. 753.
80 Sornarajah, supra n. 26, p. 179.
81 L. Johnson and O. Volkov, State Liability for Regulatory Change: How Investment Rules are Overriding Domestic Law, IISD, 2014,
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2014/01/06/state-liability-for-regulatory-change-how-international-investment-rules-are-overriding-
domestic-law/, (accessed 11 June 2016).
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Apart from IIAs, political risks can be mitigated by insurance policies.82 For instance, the
Multilateral  Investment  Guarantee  Agency  (“MIGA”)  is  an  institution  providing
worldwide insurance to investors for political risks such as unlawful expropriations.83
Foreign investors may also turn to national Export Credit Agencies (“ECAs”) in their
home state, which provide trade financing to national companies in order to support
their international operations. This financing may take the form of insurance for both
commercial and political risks, thus removing the risk from the exporter.84
To sum up, this infrastructure consisting of both IIAs and insurance policies provides
reliable mechanisms of protection against political risks and an important degree of
legal  stability,  predictability  and  transparency  for  foreign  investments.85 With  this
conclusion,  the  thesis  will  now  proceed  by  examining  the  right  to  regulate  in  the
context of the protection against unlawful expropriation.
82 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 12.
83 Bishop, Crawford and Reisman, supra n. 52, p. 9.
84 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 12.
85 Bishop, Crawford and Reisman, supra n. 52, p. 9; Herdegen, supra n. 3, p. 378.
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2. The right to regulate in the context of expropriation.
The present chapter analyzes the right to regulate in relation to expropriation (see
2.1.). It examines the criteria for the determination of indirect expropriations (see 2.2.,
2.2.a., 2.2.b.), sets the conditions for their lawfulness (see 2.3.) and emphasizes the so-
called  “police  powers  doctrine” inserting  an  exception  to  the  states'  obligation  to
compensate the investor in case of expropriation (see 2.4., 2.4.a.).
2.1. Elements of expropriation.
Before proceeding to the analysis of the above issues, it is worth clarifying some basic
terms.  First  of  all,  the  term  expropriation  refers  to  “a  state's  taking  of  property-
something of value- away from its owner”.86 In fact, expropriation constitutes the most
drastic interference with an investor's private property and therefore it is one of  the
most  serious  threats  to  foreign  investments.87 Although  it  has  been  subject  to
continuous discussions and debates, expropriation has not yet been uniformly defined
under  IIAs  with any  significant  degree of  specificity.88 Its  scope under  international
investment  law  is  regarded  to  be  quite  broad  and  general,  encompassing  state
interferences with any kind of tangible and intangible property rights or interests in an
investment.89 
Expropriation can take various forms. The most important distinction is between direct
and indirect expropriations. The difference between the two lies primarily in whether
the legal title of the owner is transfered or not.90 More precisely, direct expropriation is
the  outright  taking  of  the  investor's  property  through  formal transfer  of  title  or
immediate physical seizure.91 For instance, confiscations or nationalizations of strategic
industries are classic forms of direct expropriations.92 However, the latter have become
relatively  rare,93 since  they  constitute  rather  extreme  measures  causing  negative
86 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 161.
87 K. Hobér, Investment Arbitration in Eastern Europe-In Search of a Definition of Expropriation, New York, JurisNet, LLC, 2007, p. 7.
88 A.K. Hoffmann, 'Indirect Expropriation', in: A. Reinisch, Standards of Investment Protection, New York, Oxford University Press,
2008, p. 151; A. Newcombe and L. Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment , Alphen aan den Rijn,
Kluwer Law International, 2009, p. 322.
89 T. Fecák, International Investment Agreements and EU Law, The Netherlands, Kluwer Law International, 2016, p. 31.
90 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 161.
91 Hoffmann, supra n. 88, p. 151; OECD (2004), “''Indirect Expropriation'' and the ''Right to Regulate'' in International Investment
Law”,  OECD Working Papers on International Investment,  2004/04, OECD Publishing,  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/780155872321
(accessed 18 September 2016).
92 Newcombe and Paradell, supra n. 88, p. 324.
93 Very few IIA cases have involved claims of direct expropriation; See for example the case  Mr.  Franz Sedelmayer v. Russian
Federation, SCC Case No. 16 W 35/02, (Award, 7 July 1998); Newcombe and Paradell, supra n. 88, p. 341. 
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publicity  which  may affect  the investment  climate  within  the host  states  and thus
prevent future investments.94
Hence, indirect expropriations today have become the common form of expropriation95
and will be the central focus of this thesis. Indirect expropriations are characterized by
the fact that the title of property remains untouched but the investor either loses the
possibility to make a meaningful use of the investment, or the value of the investment
is undermined to such an extent that deprives the owner of the  “reasonably-to-be-
expected economic benefit of property”,96 leaving the investor  “with the more or less
emptied shell of ownership”.97 Arbitrary taxation, deprivation of profits or unjustified
interference  with  the  management  of  the  investment  are  typical  examples  of
governmental  measures that may constitute indirect expropriation.98 The latter may
also take various forms such as “regulatory” or “creeping” expropriation. Moreover, it
is often referred to in BITs with terms such as measures “equivalent to”, “tantamount
to” or having “the same effect” as expropriation, thereby focusing more on the effects
rather  than  the  intentions  of  the  host  state.99 Nevertheless,  BITs  provide  little
assistance in defining indirect expropriation and despite the various efforts of arbitral
tribunals to clarify its scope,100 no generally recognized definition has been established
yet.101 Consequently, the concept of indirect expropriation remains quite vague, often
giving rise to governments to deny its existence and the payment of compensation and
therefore creating various complications in practice.102 
2.2. Criteria for determining indirect expropriations.
The lack of clear rules as to what constitutes an indirect expropriation has caused much
controversy,  particularly  as  regards  the  distinction  between  indirect  expropriations
requiring  compensation  and  governmental  measures,  which  may  negatively  affect
foreign investments, though do not trigger the states' obligation to compensate the
94 Dolzer and Schreuer, supra n. 32, p. 92.
95 Bishop, Crawford and Reisman, supra n. 52, p. 593.
96 Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, (Award, 30 August 2000), para. 103; See also
Dolzer and Schreuer, supra n. 32, p. 92; Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 161.
97 Herdegen, supra n. 3, pp. 407-408.
98 Newcombe and Paradell, supra n. 88, p. 327.
99 Mouyal, supra n. 3, pp. 161, 167.
100 See for example the following cases:  Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States,  supra n. 96, para. 103;  Tecnicas
Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. the United Mexican States,  ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2 (Award, 29 May 2003), para. 114;
Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Lithuania, ICSID Case No.ARB/05/8 (Award, 12 October 2005), para. 437.
101 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 167; Herdegen, supra n. 3, p. 407.
102 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 161; Dolzer and Schreuer, supra n. 32, p. 92. 
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investors.103 Thus,  a  distinction  on  a  general  basis  cannot  be  made,104 instead  the
matter has to be approached on a case-by-case basis.105 Nevertheless, a number of
indicative factors have emerged in this respect from both IIAs and arbitral practice,
whose  role  has  been  decisive  in  finding  whether  an  indirect  expropriation  has
occurred.106 These factors will be examined in detail below. 
2.2.a. Indicative factors in BITs.
There is a common trend in many recent IIAs107 to include a list of factors in their body
which need to be considered when trying to distinguish between compensable and
non-compensable regulation.108 The first factor relates to the effect, i.e the economic
impact that the governmental measures may have on the foreign investment, while
simultaneously it is clarified that a mere adverse effect on the economic value of the
investment does not suffice to establish expropriation requiring compensation.109 
Another factor referred to in some BITs but frequently contested in arbitral practice,
relates  to  the  degree  of  interference  of  the  governmental  measures  with  the
investment-backed expectations  of the investor. Hence, it is examined to what extent
the measures might affect the conditions on which the investor based its decision to
invest.110 This  factor  is  closely  connected with the principle  of  stability  of  the host
state's legal and political framework.111 For example, an investor who decides to invest
in  a  state  having  knowledge  of  its  economic  and  political  unrest  or  in  an  area
characterized by frequent regulatory changes, will hardly convince the tribunal that it
could not reasonably have expected that political decisions or policy changes affecting
its investment would occur.112 Although typically an element of the FET standard, the
concept  of  legitimate  expectations  has  been  increasingly  used  by  tribunals  in  the
context of indirect expropriation as well. Indeed, a number of tribunals have taken into
103 OECD (2004), supra n. 91, p. 3; Fecák, supra n. 89, p. 32. 
104 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 169.
105 See for example Annex B.13(1)(b) of the 2004 Canadian Model BIT, according to which:“The determination of whether a
measure or series of measures of a Party constitute an indirect expropriation requires a case-by case, fact-based inquiry...”; Mouyal,
supra n. 3, p. 171.
106 OECD (2004), supra n. 91, p. 3. 
107 See for instance Annex B.13(1) of the 2004 Canadian Model BIT; Annex B.4(a)of the 2012 US Model BIT; Annex 9-B(3)(a) of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement; Annex 10-B.3(a) of the Australia-Chile FTA and Annex 10-D.4(a) of the US-Chile FTA.
108 Mouyal, supra n. 3, pp. 170-171. 
109 Ibid, p. 171.
110 Ibid, p. 171.
111 Hoffmann, supra n. 88, p. 162.
112 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 172; A. Boute, 'The quest for regulatory stability in the EU energy market: an analysis through the prism
of legal certainty', Vol. 37, No. 6, European Law Review (2012), 675(681). Available from: Westlaw UK, (accessed 25 October 2016).
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consideration  this  concept  when  establishing  the  existence  of  an  expropriation  or
denying it due to lack of interference with such expectations.113 For instance, in LG&E v.
Argentina the tribunal stated that one must analyze “the measure's economic impact-
its interference with the investor's reasonable expectations”114 in order to evaluate the
degree of the measure's interference with the investor's right of ownership. Moreover,
in Occidental v. Ecuador the tribunal failed to find an expropriation holding that “there
has been no deprivation of the use or reasonably expected economic benefit of the
investment”,115 while in  Metalclad v. Mexico  the tribunal cited the  “reasonably-to-be-
expected economic benefit”116 in reaching its finding of an indirect expropriation.
The third factor relates to the character of the measure, a notion which encompasses
the type of the measure (fiscal or non-fiscal), its object and context, as well as the host
state's intentions and the purpose it seeks to achieve.117 Contrary to the “sole effect
doctrine”,  which will be developed below (see 2.5.) and which focuses exclusively on
the effect of the regulatory measure on the foreign investor's property, the so-called
“balanced approach” may take all the above elements into consideration in order to
assess whether an indirect expropriation has  occurred.118 For  instance,  as it  will  be
indicated under the  “police powers doctrine”  (see 2.4.), non-discriminatory measures
adopted to pursue legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the
environment will  only exceptionally constitute indirect expropriation,  since they are
decisive  for  the  functioning,  internal  prosperity  and  further  development  of  the
state.119
2.2.b. Indicative factors in arbitral practice.
Apart  from  the  indicative  factors  established  in  BITs,  some additional  factors  have
emerged from arbitral practice as well. The substantiality of the governmental measure
imposed, namely the severity of its economic impact upon the foreign investment, has
113 U. Kriebaum, 'Standards of Protection', in: M. Bungenberg et al.,  International Investment Law- A Handbook, 1st  edn, Baden-
Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2015, pp. 1006-1007.
114 LG & E v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case Nº ARB/02/1, (Decision on Liability 3 October 2006), para. 190.
115 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 3467, (Final Award 1 July 2004),
para. 89.
116 Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, supra n. 96, para. 103.
117 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 172.
118 Ibid, p. 190.
119 See for example Annex B.4(b) of the 2008 United States-Rwanda BIT, according to which: “Except in rare circumstances, non-
discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as
public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations”; See also Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 170; OECD
(2004), supra n. 91, p. 16.
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been  considered  as  one  of  the  most  significant  factors  in  determining  whether  a
regulatory taking amounts to indirect expropriation. As it has been repeatedly stressed
by tribunals, mere interferences or simple restrictions on the investors' property rights
do  not  constitute  indirect  expropriation.  Instead,  the  interference  has  to  be  so
substantial  as  to  deprive  the  investor  of  its  fundamental  economic  rights  namely
ownership,  management,  use  or  enjoyment  of  the  investment,  by  rendering  them
useless.120 This is clearly reflected in  Starrett Housing v. Iran  where it was held that
“...measures taken by a State can interfere with property rights to such an extent that
these  rights  are  rendered  so  useless  that  they  must  be  deemed  to  have  been
expropriated...”.121 Moreover,  in  Telenor  v  Hungary the  tribunal  stated  that “..the
interference with  the investor's  rights  must  be such as  substantially  to  deprive the
investor of the economic value, use or enjoyment of its investment”,122 while in Pope &
Talbot  v.  Canada it  was  confirmed  that  “...under  international  law,  expropriation
requires a 'substantial deprivation'”.123 This view has been recently endorsed in Philip
Morris  v.  Uruguay,  where  the tribunal  repeated that  “the  State’s  measures  should
amount to a “substantial deprivation” of its value, use or enjoyment”.124
Another  key  element  for  assessing  whether  a  measure  constitutes  indirect
expropriation is the element of control. As practice has shown, it is particularly difficult
to find an indirect expropriation where the investor retains full control and ownership
over the investment and the latter still  yields some profits, even if the investor has
been deprived of some specific rights.125 This is clearly illustrated in  LG&E where the
tribunal denied the existence of expropriation given the investor's continuing control
over the investment and pointed out that “an interference with the investment's ability
to carry on its business is not satisfied where the investment continues to operate, even
if profits are diminished”.126 Similarly, in Azurix v. Argentina it was found that, despite
the fact that the management of a water concession was affected by Argentina, this did
not  amount  to  expropriation  since  the  investor  had  retained  control  over  the
120 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 182; OECD (2004), supra n. 91, pp. 10-11.
121 Starrett Housing Corporation v. Iran, 4 Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Case No. 24, (Interlocutory Award 19 December 1983), p. 154.
122 Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. The Republic of Hungary,  ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, (Award 13 September 2006),
para.65.
123 Pope and Talbot v. the Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, (Interim Award 26 June 2000), para. 102.
124 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. And Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/7, (Award 8 July 2016), para. 192.
125 Herdegen, supra n. 3, p. 408.
126 LG & E v. The Argentine Republic, supra n. 114, para. 191.
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enterprise.127 However, relying entirely on control as the sole criterion for determining
indirect  expropriation  does  not  always  lead  to  safe  conclusions,  instead,  some
additional elements may often need to be considered. If for instance an investor retains
full  control  over  its  investment but the host  state's  interference is  so severe  as  to
deprive it of its economic value, leaving the investor with nothing more than a shell
with no economic significance, an expropriation will probably occur.128 Indicatively, in
Middle  East  Cement  v.  Egypt,  despite  the  investor's  retention  of  control  and  its
possibility to continue supply and exportation of cement, the tribunal considered that
these “were not economically feasible alternatives”.129
The  duration  of  the  governmental  measure,  namely  its  permanent  or  temporary
character, is another important criterion for the distinction between compensable and
non-compensable regulation, since it connotes the severity of the measure imposed.130
However, the case law has been quite incoherent in this respect. More precisely, some
tribunals have held that the measures adopted by the state must be of a “permanent”
and  “irreversible” character  in order to amount to expropriation.131 This  permanent
character was emphasized for example in Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, where the tribunal
held  that  “the  practical  and  economic  use  of  the  Property  by  the  Claimant  was
irretrievably  lost,  notwithstanding  that  remained  in  possession  of  the  Property”.132
Likewise in Feldman v Mexico the tribunal stressed that the Respondent's actions had
deprived  the  Claimant  “completely  and  permanently  of  any  potential  economic
benefits”  from his activity of purchasing and exporting Mexican cigarettes.133 On the
other hand, some tribunals have held that expropriation might also occur even if the
measures imposed have a partial or temporary character.134 An illustrative case in this
regard is S.D. Myers v. Canada, where the tribunal despite finding an eighteen month
export ban to be a temporary deprivation not amounting to expropriation, stated that
“in some contexts and circumstances, it would be appropriate to view a deprivation as
127 Azurix Corporation v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, (Award 14 July 2006), para. 322.
128 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 185.
129 Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v. The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, (Award 12 April
2002), para. 168.
130 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 178.
131 See Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. the United Mexican States,  supra n. 100, para. 116 according to which: “it is
understood that the measures adopted by a State, whether regulatory or not, are an indirect de facto expropriation if they are
irreversible and permanent”; See also Hoffmann, supra n. 88, p. 159.
132 Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. The Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, (Final Award, 17 February
2000), para. 81.
133 Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, supra n. 44, para. 109.
134 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 180.
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amounting to expropriation, even if it were partial or temporary”.135 It is notable that
although the eighteen month export ban was regarded as a temporary deprivation in
this case, a fourth month suspension of an export license in Middle East Cement,136 as
well as a one year seizure of two hotels in Wena Hotels v. Egypt,137 were found not to
be  “merely ephemeral”138 and therefore amounted to expropriation.139 Consequently,
“there is no mathematical formula to reach a mechanical result”,140 instead much will
depend on the specific circumstances of each case.141
Last  but  not  least, fair  process  is  another  indicative  factor  which  may  assist  in
determining  whether  compensation  should  be  paid.  Procedural  fairness  is  an
expression  of  the  rule  of  law  and  a  vital  element  of  the  FET  standard  covering
protection from denial of justice.142 In fact, due process is the antithesis to denial of
justice and encompasses fundamental legal principles such as legality, consistency and
transparency.143 Practice has shown that due process may have some role to play in
relation to expropriation. For instance, the issue of transparency played a pivotal role in
Metalclad, where the tribunal held that the measures adopted by Mexico with regard
to a local construction permit amounted to indirect expropriation since they had been
enacted in a non-transparent manner.144 A compensable taking may also occur in case
of cancellations of permits and licenses realized without due process.145 For example in
Tecmed v. Mexico, the tribunal held that the revocation of a license for the operation of
a landfill  amounted to expropriation,  inter alia,  because of a failure of the relevant
environmental  regulatory  authority  to  notify  the  Claimant  of  its  intentions,  thus
depriving it of its right to be heard.146 
To sum up, the list of factors analyzed above is not necessarily exhaustive, instead it
135 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, (Partial Award 13 November 2000), para. 283.
136 Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, supra n. 129, para. 107.
137 Wena Hotels Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, (Award 8 December 2000), para. 99.
138 See the case Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, 6 Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Case
No. 7, (Award 22 June 1984), p. 225, where the Iran-United States claims tribunal ruled that the appointment of a temporary
manager by the host state against the will of the foreign investor will constitute a taking if the consequential deprivation is not
“merely ephemeral”.
139 Dolzer and Schreuer, supra n. 32, p. 113; Hoffmann, supra n. 88, p. 159.
140 Azurix Corporation v. The Argentine Republic, supra n. 127, para. 313.
141 Hoffmann, supra n. 88, p. 160.
142 See Article 5(2)(a) of the 2004 US Model BIT according to which: “...'fair and equitable treatment' includes the obligation not to
deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied
in the principal legal systems of the world...”.
143 Mouyal, supra n. 3, pp. 185-186; Schreuer, supra n. 48, p. 381.
144 Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, supra n. 96, para. 107. 
145 Sornarajah, supra n. 26, p. 402.
146 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. the United Mexican States, supra n. 100, para. 162.
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may evolve in the future.147 These factors are just indicative and may often need to be
considered in  combination with other  factors.  In  any case,  the distinction between
expropriation  and  non-compensable  regulation  requires  a  comparison  of  the
investment before and after the imposition of the measure.148
2.3. Conditions for lawful expropriations.
Once  the  regulatory  measures  imposed  qualify  the  above  developed  criteria  and
therefore amount to expropriation, the next step involves an examination of whether
such expropriation is lawful. Indeed when it comes to foreign property, expropriation
must  comply  with  specific  international  law  standards  which  are  almost  uniformly
established  in  IIAs.  The  latter  set  a  number  of  conditions  which  must  apply
cumulatively in order for an expropriation to be lawful. More precisely, the measures
taken must be  “for a public purpose”,  “non-discriminatory”, in accordance with  “due
process  of  law”  and accompanied  by  “prompt,  adequate  and  effective
compensation”.149 Of  these  requirements,  the  most  significant  and  controversial  in
practice150 has  been  the  one  requiring  payment  of  “prompt”,  “adequate” and
“effective” compensation according to the  “Hull formula”,151 which is regarded to be
the  prevailing  doctrine  in  most  BITs.152 Prompt means  payment  of  compensation
without undue delay,  adequate refers  το  compensation equivalent to the fair market
value of the investment, for the assessment of which various different methods exist,
while  effective ensures that compensation is made in a freely convertible currency.153
Clearly, the obligation to pay compensation even for a lawful expropriation imposes an
important  restriction on the right  of  states  to regulate.154 All  the above mentioned
conditions  must  be  fulfilled  cumulatively,155 otherwise  the  expropriation  will  be
147 OECD (2004), supra n. 91, p. 22.
148 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 187. 
149 See for example Article 5 of the BIT between Czech Republic and Hungary; See also: Fecák, supra n. 89, pp. 30-31; I. Marboe,
'Valuation in Cases of Expropriation', in: M. Bungenberg et al.,  International Investment Law- A Handbook, 1st  edn, Baden-Baden,
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2015, pp. 1060-1061. 
150 Newcombe and Paradell, supra n. 88, pp. 369, 377.
151 Hull formula has its roots in the Mexican expropriations of assets belonging to American nationals in the late 1930s which
were intended to achieve land reforms. As the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, replied to the Foreign Minister of Mexico: “Under
every rule of law and equity, no government is entitled to expropriate private property, for whatever purposes, without provision
for  prompt,  adequate  and  effective  compensation”;  See  C.  Nyombi,  'Investor-state  compensation in  the  shadow  of  the  Hull
formula', Vol. 26, No. 12, International Company and Commercial Law Review (2015), 377 (379-380). Available from: Westlaw UK,
(accessed 23 May 2016).
152 Herdegen, supra n. 3, p. 366. 
153 Nyombi, supra n. 151, p. 380.
154 Titi, supra n. 1, p. 150.
155 Dolzer and Schreuer, supra n. 32, p. 91. 
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considered unlawful, in which case the state will  incur state responsibility requiring
reparation,156 due to breach of the relevant investment treaty.157 At this point, an issue
that  has  often been contested relates  to whether  the failure  to pay compensation
renders the expropriation per se unlawful. Although a strict interpretation of the treaty
terms would support  this  outcome,  the prevailing view, as  well  as  arbitral  practice
seem to have adopted a more lenient approach, holding that the lack of compensation
does not render the expropriation “ipso facto wrongful”. This is particularly true when
it  comes  to  direct  expropriations.158 Indicatively,  in  Tidewater  v.  Venezuela the
expropriation was held to be lawful  since it  wanted only compensation,159 while  in
Mobil v. Venezuela the tribunal clearly stated that “the mere fact that an investor has
not  received  compensation  does  not  itself  render  an  expropriation  unlawful”.160
Similarly,  in  Quiborax  v.  Non  Metallic  Minerals  S.A.  the  tribunal  found  that the
expropriation was unlawful for various reasons,  not only because it lacked
compensation.161 Conversely, illegality might be the consequence in case of an outright
rejection  by  the  expropriating  state  of  its  obligation  to  compensate,  or  in  case  of
indirect expropriations162 where illegality will be the rule, since there will be generally
no compensation.163
2.4. The police powers doctrine.
The fact that foreign property cannot be taken without payment of compensation is a
well recognized principle in international investment law. However, the rapid expansion
of indirect expropriations in recent years has caused a growing concern among host
states that the latter might also apply to regulatory measures taken by governments to
156 It is widely accepted that the applicable standard for the assessment of damages resulting from an unlawful act is set out in
the  Chorzόw  Factory  case,  and  later  formulated  in  Article  31  of  the  Articles  on  International  State  Responsibility  of  the
International Law Commission, which requires “full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act”; See case
Factory at  Chorzόw (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13), para. 125; UNCTAD,  Expropriation- UNCTAD Series on
Issues in International Investment Agreements II, New York and Geneva, United Nations Publication, 2012, p. 112.
157 Kriebaum, supra n. 113, p. 1017; Marboe, supra n. 149, p. 1061.
158 Marboe, supra n. 149, p. 1061.
159 Tidewater Investment Srl, Tidewater Caribe, C.A. v. The Bolivarian Republic Of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5, (Award, 13
March 2015), para. 146.
160 Venezuela Holdings, B.V. Mobil Cerro Negro Holding, Ltd. Mobil Venezolana De Petróleos Holdings, Inc. Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd.
And Mobil Venezolana De Petróleos, Inc  v. The Bolivarian Republic Of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, (Award, 9 October
2014), para. 301.
161 Quiborax S.A. and Non Metallic Minerals S.A. v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, (Award, 16 September
2015), para. 370; Similar cases in this regard are, for example:  ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips Hamaca B.V. and
ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, (Decision on Jurisdiction and the
Merits, 3 September 2013), para. 342; Quasar des Valores SICAV S.A., Orgor des Valores SICAV S.A., GBI 9000SICAV S.A. and ALOS
34 S.L. v. Russia, SCC Award, SCC No 24/2007, (Award 20 July 2012), para. 215.
162 Marboe, supra n. 149, p. 1061.
163 Dolzer and Schreuer, supra n. 32, p. 91.
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promote public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the environment. This
would mean that host states would have to pay compensation for measures adopted in
pursuit  of  their  legitimate  social  welfare  interests,  something  which  would  be
completely contrary to states' right to freely regulate their internal affairs.  Therefore,
the need to draw a line between indirect expropriations requiring compensation and
non-compensable governmental measures, has become more imperative than ever.164
As explained earlier,  states in the context of  their  sovereign powers are entitled to
regulate foreign investments, even if this might be detrimental to the foreign investors'
interests,  a  power  conceptualized  as  the  “police  powers  doctrine”.165 This  doctrine
inserts  an  exception  to  the  general  rule  that  compensation  must  be  paid  for
expropriation.166 According  to  it,  a  host  state  will  not  be  liable  for  any  wealth
deprivation realized in order to protect its populace as long as this action falls within
the state's police powers,167 irrespective of whether the remaining requirements for
the lawfulness of expropriations are fulfilled. In fact, three broad categories of police
powers regulation have been recognized by international authorities relating to public
order  and  morality,  protection  of  human  health  and  the  environment  and  state
taxation.168 
Nevertheless,  the  assessment  of  police  power  regulation  must  involve  some
assessment of necessity and proportionality. “A state is not permitted in international
law to simply identify some hypothetical risk, take draconian regulatory measures to
address it and then claim that the measures taken are justified under the state's police
powers”.169 Instead,  a  proportionality  test  has  to  be  applied  for  every  regulatory
measure imposed in order not to constitute indirect expropriation. This test involves
three  steps  consisting  of an  assessment  of  the  suitability  of  the  measure  for  the
realization of the specific governmental purpose, an examination of the necessity of
the measure, namely if there is a relatively less restrictive measure available that could
manage the same purpose and finally an evaluation of the effects of the measure on
the investor's right that has been affected in relation to the public interest pursued.170
164 OECD (2004), supra n. 91, pp. 2-3
165 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 177. 
166 I Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th edn, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998, p. 624.
167 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 177; Newcombe, supra n. 42, Abstract.
168 Newcombe and Paradell, supra n. 88, p. 358. 
169 Newcombe, supra n. 42, p. 28.
170 P. Ranjan, 'Using the public law concept of proportionality to balance investment protection with regulation in international
investment law: a critical appraisal',  Vol.  3, No. 3,  Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law  (2014), 853(857).
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The proportionality test can be detected in a number of awards and is often reflected
in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.171 Tecmed was one of the first cases that emphasized
the aspect of proportionality by reference to the ECtHR case-law,172 holding that “There
must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the charge or weight
imposed to the foreign investor and the aim sought to be realized by any expropriatory
measure”.173 Likewise  in  Azurix it  was  stated  that  the  proportionality  test  would
“provide useful  guidance”174 in determining whether an expropriation has occurred,
while  the  tribunal  in  El  Paso  v.  Argentina held  that, “proportionality  has  to  exist
between the public purpose fostered by the regulation and the interference with the
investors' property rights”.175 
Below it will be examined how the police powers doctrine is reflected in the various
international  investment  instruments  and  arbitral  awards  and  particularly  how  it
becomes relevant in more recent investment treaties. 
2.5. The police powers in practice.
The view that no right to compensation arises for reasonably necessary regulations
adopted  for  the  “protection  of  public  health,  safety,  morals  or  welfare”176 or  for
government  regulations  that  are  “non-discriminatory  and...within  the  commonly
accepted  taxation  and  police  powers  of  states”177 has  been  regularly  followed  by
international law authorities.178 According to the OECD, “it is an accepted principle of
customary international law that where economic injury results from a bona fide non-
discriminatory regulation within the police power of the State,  compensation is not
required”.179 The  police  powers  doctrine  is  also  reflected  in  various  international
Available from: Westlaw UK, (accessed 30 October 2016).
171 Mouyal, supra n. 3 , p. 191.
172 See Protocol No. 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; See also, Ranjan, supra
n. 170, p. 866.
173 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. the United Mexican States, supra n. 100, para. 122.
174 Azurix Corporation v. The Argentine Republic, supra n. 127, para. 312.
175 El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, (Award 31 October 2011), para.
243.
176 G.C. Christie, 'What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law', Vol. 38, British Yearbook of International Law
(1962), 307(338).
177 G.H Aldrich, 'What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property? The Decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal',
Vol. 88, American Journal of International Law (1994), 585(609).
178 Newcombe, supra n. 42, p. 22.
179 OECD, supra n. 91, p. 5, n. 10.
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investment instruments such as the MIGA Convention,180 the US Third Restatement181
and  the  Harvard  Draft  Convention.182 Additionally,  this  doctrine  is  illustrated  in  a
number of arbitral awards. For example, the tribunal in  Feldman excluded any state
responsibility for loss of property or other economic damage “resulting from bona fide
general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or other action of the kind that is
commonly accepted as within the police power of states, if it is not discriminatory”,183
while the tribunal in Tecmed recognized as “undisputable” the fact that a state acting
within  its police powers may cause economic damage to those subject to its powers
without entitling them to any compensation.184
A number of tribunals, however, have rejected the police powers doctrine and have
adopted  a  different  approach,  commonly  known  as  the  “sole  effect  doctrine”.  185
According to this doctrine, an expropriation is determined exclusively by the effect of
the measure imposed on the investor regardless of the state's intentions, the public
interest or the necessity of the regulation.186 An important argument in favor of this
approach is that since the public purpose is a prerequisite for the lawfulness of the
expropriation, it cannot simultaneously justify non-compensation.187 A vivid expression
of this doctrine is contained in Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, where the tribunal stated that
“expropriatory  environmental  measures-no  matter  how  laudable  and  beneficial  to
society as a whole- are, in this respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures
that a state may take”,  concluding that  “the state's obligation to pay compensation
remains”.188 Likewise, in Azurix the tribunal considered as insufficient the criterion that
180 See Article 11(a)(ii) of the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Agreement Guarantee Agency defining expropriation as
“any legislative action or administrative action or omission attributable to the host government which has the effect of depriving
the holder of a guarantee of his ownership or control of, or a substantial benefit from, his investment, with the exception of non-
discriminatory measures of general application which governments normally take for the purpose of regulating economic activity in
their territories”; Newcombe and Paradell, supra n. 88, p. 358.
181 See  para  712  of the Restatement Third of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, according to which “... A state is not
responsible for loss of property or for other economic disadvantage resulting from bona fide general taxation, regulation, forfeiture
for crime, or other action of the kind that is commonly accepted as within the police power of states, if it is not discriminatory...”. ;
OECD (2004), supra n. 91, pp. 8-9.
182  See Article 10(5) of the Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens recognizing
the existence of a category of non-compensable takings resulting from the execution of tax laws, a general change in the value of
currency, actions in the maintenance of public order, health or morality, or from the valid exercise of belligerent rights or otherwise
incidental to the normal operation of the laws of the State; OECD (2004), supra n. 91, p. 7.
183 Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, supra n. 44, para. 105.
184 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. the United Mexican States, supra n. 100, para. 119.
185 This term has been established by Professor Dolzer because of its sole emphasis on the effect of the state measure on the
property owner; See OECD (2004), supra n. 91, p. 8; See also R.Dolzer, 'Indirect Expropriations: New Developments', Vol. 11, No. 1,
N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal (2002), 64(79); R. Dolzer and F. Bloch, 'Indirect Expropriation: Conceptual Realignments?', Vol. 5,
No. 3, International Law Forum (2003), 155(158).
186 Titi, supra n. 1, pp. 281-282; Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 187.
187 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 188.
188 Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. The Republic of Costa Rica, supra n. 132, para. 72.
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bona  fide  regulation  within  a  state's  police  powers  does  not  give  rise  to
compensation189 and emphasized that “the issue is not so much whether the measure
concerned is legitimate and serves a public purpose, but whether it is a measure that,
being  legitimate and  serving a  public  purpose,  should  give rise  to  a  compensation
claim.190
As regards investment treaties, they have not been quite consistent in relation to the
police powers doctrine. There is no general support in treaty practice of the idea that
states  may  adopt  regulatory  measures  that  do  not  call  for  compensation.191 Most
agreements focusing on investment protection remain silent about how public policy
issues,  such  as  public  health,  environmental  protection,  consumer  protection  or
prudential regulation, might interact with investment.192 However, it is notable that the
notion  of  bona  fide regulation  within  the  states'  police  powers  has  increasingly
appeared  in  recent  trade  and  investment  treaties  since  the  beginning  of  the  new
millennium.193 
Indicatively, the 2004 and 2012 US Model BITs in the section dealing with expropriation
state that  “Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a
Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives,
such  as  public  health,  safety,  and  the  environment,  do  not  constitute  indirect
expropriation”.194 Similar provisions can be traced in the 2004 Canadian Model BIT195
and the more recent TPP Agreement.196 Likewise, other recent agreements like  CETA
and  the EU-Singapore  FTA provide  that, “For  greater  certainty,  except  in  the  rare
circumstance when the impact of a measure or series of measures is so severe in light
of its purpose that it appears  manifestly excessive, non-discriminatory measures of a
Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives,
such  as  health,  safety  and  the  environment,  do  not  constitute  indirect
189 Titi, supra n. 1, p. 286.
190 Azurix Corporation v. The Argentine Republic, supra n. 127, para. 310; Other cases that have adopted the sole effect doctrine
are, for instance: Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania,  ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, (Award 7 December 2011), para 328; Siemens A.G. v.
The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, (Award 6 February 2007), para. 270.
191 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 175.
192 Public consultation on modalities for investment protection and ISDS in TTIP, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/march/tradoc_152280.pdf, (accessed 29 December 2016).
193 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 170.
194 See Annex B.(4)(b) of the 2004 and 2012 US Model BIT.
195 See Annex B.13(1)(c) of the 2004 Canadian Model BIT.
196 See Annex 9-B.(3)(b) of the 2016 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement; Although the finalized proposal of this agreement was
signed on 4 February 2016 in Auckland, New Zealand, after seven years of negotiations, it currently cannot be ratified due to the
recent U.S. withdrawal from the agreement on 23 January 2017 under the Donald Trump administration; Trans-Pacific Partnership,
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans-Pacific_Partnership, (accessed 24 January 2017).
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expropriations”.197 A similar provision is found in the new EU-Vietnam FTA,198 as well as
in the currently negotiated TTIP agreement which further adds “public morals, social or
consumer protection or promotion and protection of cultural diversity”199 among the
public  welfare  objectives  sought  to  be  achieved  through  the  regulatory  measures
imposed. As it has been submitted, “these provisions, whether or not introduced ex
abundanti cautela, reflect the position under general international law”.200 Even in the
absence of an explicit  treaty provision however, practice has shown that the police
powers doctrine may still be read into a BIT through proper application of the rules of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This is vividly illustrated in Philip Morris,
where the tribunal, despite the complete absence of any reference to this doctrine in
the BIT, considered  that Article 5(1) relating to expropriation must be interpreted in
accordance with Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in light of customary international law, as a
“relevant rule of international law applicable to the relations between the parties”.201
The  tribunal  thought  that  the  States'  police  power  was  reflected  in  customary
international  law  and  thus  applied  to  the  expropriation  analysis  accordingly,202
concluding  that  the challenged measures  were a  valid  exercise  of  Uruguay's  police
powers  for  the  protection  of  public  health  and  therefore  did  not  amount  to
expropriation.203
On the whole,  it  appears that  the police  powers doctrine has  evolved into a well-
established principle in international investment law. Although IIAs remain somehow
inconsistent in  this  respect,  often failing to include any relevant  provisions in their
context at all, there has been a remarkable trend in more recent IIAs to change that.
The current IIA examination demonstrates some support of the view of preferential
treatment for regulation employed to pursue social welfare objectives such as health,
safety and the environment.204 In this context, the reliance on the VCLT seems to be
197 See Annex 8-A.(3) of the 2016 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the European Union and Canada and
Annex 9-A.(2) of the 2015 EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement.
198 See Annex on Expropriation of the 2016 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, para. 3.
199 See Annex I(3) of the currently negotiated Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.
200 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. And Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, supra n. 124,
para. 301.
201 Ibid, para. 290.
202 K.  Mitchell,  'Philip  Morris  v  Uruguay:  an  affirmation of  'Police  Powers'  and  'Regulatory  Power  in  the Public  Interest'  in
International Investment Law',  Blog of the European Journal of International Law,  2016,  http://www.ejiltalk.org/philip-morris-v-
uruguay-an-affirmation-of-police-powers-and-regulatory-power-in-the-public-interest-in-international-investment-law/,  (accessed
28 December 2016).
203 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. And Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay,  supra n. 124
para. 307.
204 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 175.
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more than welcome. Indeed, the Philip Morris v. Uruguay  decision is the latest in a
series of decisions suggesting that expropriation provisions in BITs properly interpreted
in accordance with the VCLT accommodate the police powers of States, even absent of
explicit treaty language to that effect.205 The latter practice, along with the increasing
move  towards  the  inclusion  of  the  police  powers  doctrine  in  new  and  currently
negotiated IIAs, contribute to the expansion of this doctrine which is gaining a more
steady position in treaty and arbitral practice and in international investment law in
general.  This  further  contributes  to  the  much  desired  delimitation  between
compensable and non-compensable regulation, offering a more stable and predictable
basis in this regard and thus enhancing the host states' right to freely regulate internal
matters in the public interest without carrying a duty to compensate the investor. 
205 Mitchell, supra n. 202.
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3. Enhancing the right of states to regulate.
Having set forth the ever-increasing role of the right to regulate in practice, the present
chapter  will  underline  the  need for  a  reform of  the  IIA  regime (see  3.1.)  and will
provide  some  recommendations  with a  view  to  reinforcing  the  right  of  states  to
regulate, in light of UNCTAD's recent initiatives in connection with this right (see 3.2.).
3.1. The need for IIA reform.
The preceding analysis has revealed that, although significant steps have been made in
recent years by some IIAs towards enhancing the right of states to regulate foreign
investments  and  achieving  a  new  balance  between  host  states'  and  investors'
conflicting  interests,  still  much  remains  to  be  done.  Against  the  global  trend  to
formulate a “new generation of investment policies”, focusing on inclusive growth and
sustainable development while  seeking to attract and benefit  from investment,206 a
consolidated reform of the IIA regime to ensure it works for all stakeholders,207 seems
to be more imperative than ever. The question is not anymore about whether or not to
to  reform,  but  about “the  what,  how  and  extent  of  such  reform”.208 UNCTAD's
Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development has a core role to play in
this regard. As a principal organ of the United Nations General Assembly dealing with
trade, investment, and development issues,209 UNCTAD has developed this framework
to provide guidance to IIA reform210 and to offer a reference point for policymakers.211
In  fact,  safeguarding  the  right  of  states  to  regulate,  while  providing  protection  to
foreign investors, is included in UNCTAD's guidance for IIA reform as one of its principal
challenges.212 The following part will examine some indicative ways in which this reform
could be achieved, account being taken of UNCTAD's suggested reform tools. 
206 IIA Issues Note- Taking Stock of IIA Reform, UNCTAD, 2016, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Taking_Stock_of_IIA_reform_March_2016.pdf, (accessed 30 October 2016).
207 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015- Reforming International Investment Governance, Geneva, United Nations Publication,
2015, p. 120.
208 UNCTAD, supra n. 12, p. 108.
209 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 2016, 
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3.2. Recommendations for IIA reform.
There are a number of ways to improve the IIA regime so as to enhance the right to
regulate in international investment law. First of all, this right should be reflected in the
preamble of the various IIAs,213 namely, by using positive language in these preambles.
A relevant example can be found, for instance, in the preamble of the 2012 US Model
BIT, stating as a desideratum the achievement of the treaty's objectives “in a manner
consistent  with  the  protection  of  health,  safety,  and  the  environment,  and  the
promotion of  internationally  recognized  labor  rights”.214 Indeed,  there  is  a  need to
depart  from the traditional  approach followed in BIT preambles,  focusing solely  on
investment promotion and protection and instead to adopt a more balanced approach
encompassing public welfare objectives, as well.215 This would oblige arbitrators to take
non-economic policy objectives into consideration when interpreting IIAs' substantive
provisions.216 Moreover, the preambles of more recent IIAs such as CETA,217 TPP or the
EU-Singapore FTA, explicitly  “recognize (the parties') inherent right to regulate”218 or
“reaffirm  each  Party’s  right  to  adopt  and  enforce  measures  necessary  to  pursue
legitimate policy objectives...”.219 Preambles following this approach would reverse the
old trends which see the right to regulate as something exceptionally granted under
trade and investment agreements and would instead recognize this right as an integral
part  of the state sovereignty to be restricted only in specified circumstances220 and
“only when it is demonstrably in the public interest to do so”.221 In any case, the role of
the  preambles  should  not  be  underestimated.  The  latter  encapsulate  the  treaty's
object  and  purpose  and  by  virtue  of  the  VCLT,222 they  may  constitute  a  significant
interpretative tool at the arbitrator's disposal.223 In other words, all IIA obligations shall
be  interpreted  in  light  of  the  objectives  laid  down  in  the  preamble.224The  use  of
positive language in the preamble has the advantage that the usual structure of IIAs is
213 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 231.
214 Titi, supra n. 1, p. 116.
215 Mouyal, supra n. 3, pp. 91-93.
216 Ibid, pp. 231-232.
217 See the preamble of the 2016  Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the European Union and Canada,
stating: “Recognising that the provisions of this Agreement preserve the right of the Parties to regulate within their territories and
the Parties' flexibility to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as public health, safety, environment, public morals and the
promotion and protection of cultural diversity...”.
218 See the preamble of the 2016 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.
219 See the preamble of the 2015 EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement.
220 Sornarajah, supra n. 46, p. 223.
221 Mann, supra n. 5, p. 216.
222 See Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
223 Titi, supra n. 1, p. 115.
224 UNCTAD, supra n. 207, p. 142.
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not affected. However, it  only creates soft obligations,  namely the reflection of  the
state's regulatory interests exclusively in the preamble creates no specific or legally
enforceable right, but a mere interpretative tool.225 
Positive language can also be used in the substantive parts of the agreement in the
form  of  a  non-relaxation-of-standards  clause.226 This  clause  may  state  that  the
contracting parties shall avoid relaxing specific policy standards such as environmental
or labor standards in an endeavor to attract foreign investment,227 so as to avoid a so-
called regulatory “race to the bottom”.228 Such a clause can be found, for example, in
the  Canadian  Model  BIT  which  states  that  “...it  is  inappropriate  to  encourage
investment  by  relaxing  domestic  health,  safety  or  environmental  measures”.229
Although such a clause itself  does not afford a right to regulate, it may serve as an
ancillary  means  of  safeguarding policy  space  by  encouraging an  interpretation that
balances investor rights against host state's  interests230 and ultimately manages the
interaction between IIAs and national policies.231 In any case, positive language either
in the preamble or in the substantive parts of a treaty, needs to be taken into account
when interpreting a treaty, as part of its context.232
Another option is to include a so-called “declaratory right to regulate” in the operative
part of the agreement.233 In such case, the right to regulate would be recognized as an
inherent right underlying the substantive investment protection standards234 and would
reassure the contracting state that investment activity in its territory is realized with
respect for its legitimate public welfare objectives.235. A relevant example can be found
in Article 12 of Norway's New Draft Model BIT of 2015, which is entitled  “Right to
regulate”.236 Nevertheless,  it  could be argued that the phrase  “otherwise consistent
with”  contained in this and relevant treaties, may  a  contrario lead to the conclusion
that any measure that is not consistent with the treaty is de jure incompatible with the
225 Titi, supra n. 1, pp. 121-122.
226 UNCTAD, supra n. 207, p. 158.
227 Titi, supra n. 1, p. 105.
228 Newcombe and Paradell, supra n. 88, p. 509.
229 See Article 15 of the 2004 Canadian Model BIT entitled “Health, Safety and Environmental Measures”.
230 Titi, supra n. 1, pp. 104, 122.
231 UNCTAD, supra n. 207, p. 158.
232 See Article 31(1)(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; See also Titi, supra n. 1, p. 122.
233 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 232.
234 Ibid, p. 232.
235 Titi, supra n. 1, p. 104.
236 This Article provides that: “Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or
enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Agreement that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity is
undertaken in a manner sensitive to health, safety or environmental concerns”.
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obligations it imposes and thus may, in fact, set an impediment to the recognition of a
general regulatory freedom.237
Another way to expressly incorporate a right to regulate in IIAs is by inserting general
exceptions applicable to all  or many of IIA obligations in order to exclude particular
sectors or subject matters from the IIA scope, or to permit measures necessary to meet
specific objectives.238 For instance, an IIA may include public policy exceptions in order
to protect legitimate policy objectives such as public order and morality, public health
or  the  environment,239 national  security  exceptions  in  case  of  threat  of  the  state's
essential  security  interests,240 or  balance-of-payments  exceptions  in  the  event  of
payment  difficulties  or  serious  financial  and  economic  crises.241 Where  included,
general  exceptions  are  typically  introduced by  “nothing  in  this  agreement shall  be
construed to prevent a party from…”242 or similar phrases.243 By including exceptions in
an IIA, states may be allowed, under specified circumstances, to take measures that
might  otherwise  be  challengeable.  Thus,  such  exceptions,  if  carefully  drafted,  can
actually enhance the legal certainty and predictability for host states as to the scope of
IIAs' obligations.244 In any case, it is important for a state that wishes to guarantee that
its  interests  be safeguarded,  to  consider  the incorporation of  explicit exceptions.245
General international law does not provide a right to regulate in abstracto.246 Despite
the  fact  that  tribunals  have  regularly  taken  host  states'  legitimate  interests  into
consideration, there is no sufficient evidence that they will  show deference to host
states' interests, absent an express right to regulate, either in the form of exceptions or
in the form of positive language in the IIA context.247 This is mostly a matter of tribunal
discretion, therefore it is highly recommended to states to secure their right to regulate
explicitly by means of concrete provisions.248 On the other hand, investors could argue
that by including explicit exceptions for certain areas, the state may not invoke its right
237 Titi, supra n. 1, pp. 115, 294.
238 Newcombe and Paradell, supra n. 88, p. 481.
239 UNCTAD, supra n. 207, p. 140.
240 Ibid, p. 141.
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242 See for example Article 10(1) and(2) of the 2004 Canadian Model BIT.
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247 Ibid, pp. 288-289; See for example the cases: S.D. Myers, Inc. v. The Government of Canada, supra n. 135, para. 268; BG Group
Plc. v. The Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL, (Final Award 24 December 2007), para 303; Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID
Case No. ARB/06/18, ( Decision On Jurisdiction And Liability 14 January 2010), para. 513(3); In these cases, although the tribunals
recognized the host states' legitimate right to regulate, in the end they ruled in favor of the investors.
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to regulate in all other areas, something which would restrict rather than enhance the
states' regulatory powers. In order to avoid leaving policy areas and objectives outside
the scope of an exception, a suggestion would be the drafting of an indicative list of
interests provided as examples.249 Besides, the inadequate extent to which tribunals
have recognized states' regulatory freedom in the absence of explicit treaty exceptions,
increases  the  need  for  such  exceptions  and  renders  such  concerns  somehow
insignificant and untenable.250
A further element to be considered in setting out the right to regulate relates to clarity.
Most trade and investment agreements contain general obligations that lack clarity and
precision. Standards of treatment such as the MFN treatment and the FET standard, as
well  as  expropriation  standards  are  drafted  in  very  broad  terms.  This  has  been
repeatedly used by foreign investors to threaten arbitrations under IIAs as a reaction to
proposed new laws and regulations, often leading to the phenomenon of “regulatory
chill”,  namely  the  fear  of  governments  to  take  measures  due  the  uncertain
consequences of the vaguely formulated IIA rules.251 Consequently, there is a strong
need to clarify or circumscribe the scope of investment protection standards252 and
define  clearly  what  they  entail,  so  as  to  avoid  any  interpretative  ambiguity253 and
provide  governments  with  the  security  needed  to  act  in  the  public  interest.254
Particularly when it comes to indirect expropriation, it is strongly suggested to establish
uniform  criteria  that  have  to  be  met  for  an  indirect  expropriation  to  be  found.255
Furthermore, it is advisable to incorporate the police powers doctrine in more IIAs256
and define clearly which measures do not constitute indirect expropriation.257 These
options  would  help  address  the  controversial  issue  of  the  delimitation  between
compensable and non-compensable regulation which has often led to contradicting
arbitral awards. Although clarifications may help to demarcate the scope of a state's
249 Ibid, p. 296.
250 Ibid, p. 297.
251 Mann, supra n. 5, pp. 220-221.
252 More detailed provisions in this regard can be traced for instance in the 2015 EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, the 2016
EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement and the 2016 EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement; Fecák, supra n. 89, p.
294; See also UNCTAD, supra n. 207, p. 135.
253 C.  Titi,  'International  investment  law  and  the  European  Union:  towards  a  new  generation  of  international  investment
agreements', Vol. 26, No. 3, European Journal of International Law (2015), 639(655).
254 Mann, supra n. 5, p. 221.
255 Some more recent IIAs have already set out a number of criteria for the determination of an indirect expropriation; See supra
n. 107; See also UNCTAD, supra n. 207, p. 139.
256 For examples of trade and investment agreements which have included the police powers doctrine in their context see supra
n. 194-199.
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right to regulate258 it seems that something more is required to manage an appropriate
balance  between  the  state's  regulatory  concerns  and  investor's  property  rights.  A
proportionality analysis could serve as a useful tool in this respect. Recent IIAs such as
CETA,259 EU-Singapore FTA,260 EU-Vietnam FTA,261 and the currently negotiated TTIP262
seem to support a proportionality test in their rules on expropriation, by using the
same wording:  “except...when the impact of the measure or series of measures is so
severe  in  light  of  its  purpose  that  it  appears  manifestly  excessive...”.  Indeed,  the
clarification  of  substantive  standards  of  treatment,  along  with  an  appropriate
proportionality analysis would provide important interpretive guidance to tribunals and
thus  would  enhance  legal  certainty,  consistency  and  predictability  as  to  future  IIA
interpretations.263 
Another option would be to  limit the scope of the treaties' application. For instance,
the  term  investment  could  be  defined  so  as  to  cover  only  specific  types  of
investment,264 such as by setting an exhaustive list of covered investments or explicitly
exclude some types of assets.265 Moreover, it could be required that investments fulfill
specific  characteristics or  legality  requirements such as  that  they must be made in
accordance with the host state's laws.266 The same could occur with regard to investors.
For example, additional criteria could be included in the definition of the investor, such
as  that  the latter  be  engaged in  real/substantial  activities,  along with a  “denial  of
benefits clause”267 for investors that fail to meet these criteria.268
A last proposal relates to the investor-state dispute settlement. ISDS has often be seen
as a serious impediment to host states' regulatory freedom to pursue welfare reforms
and as causing “regulatory chill”  out of fear that states will be brought to arbitration
and be held liable for compensation.269 This issue could be dealt with to some extent by
limiting investors' access to ISDS. There are various ways to achieve this objective. One
way would be to exclude certain types of claims from the scope of ISDS, particularly
258 Titi, supra n. 1, p. 42.
259 See supra n. 197.
260 Ibid.
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262 See supra n. 199.
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claims relating to sensitive policy areas270 such as national security,271 or to circumscribe
admissible claims exclusively to treaty breaches. Another option would be to prohibit
access to ISDS after a certain time period or to require state consent to international
investment arbitration on a case-by-case basis. It seems that these approaches would
at least reduce states' exposure to the legal and financial risks posed by ISDS272 and
would provide them with the certainty they need to take regulatory measures in the
public interest, thereby enhancing their regulatory powers.
The list of ways for IIA reform developed above is not exhaustive, instead there are
several other means by which this reform can be achieved with a view to strengthen
the right of  states to regulate.  The preceding analysis  has  revealed that  IIA reform
mechanisms are not without risks. Each reform tool carries its own negative aspects,
while many questions remain open causing insecurity and uncertainty. Some of these
reform mechanisms do not themselves afford a right to regulate and must instead be
combined with others. Several treaties have already made use of some of these tools,
while others have used them simultaneously and without a clear structure, ultimately
causing  even  more  ambiguity  and  controversy  in  practice.  For  this  reason,  it  is
important that states choose and adapt these reform tools to their particular needs
and  choices  about  the  character,  intensity  and  extent  of  their  engagement  in  IIA
reform.273
Reforming the IIA regime consisting of thousands of agreements,274 is not an easy task.
In fact it is a global  “formidable challenge”275 requiring collective action from all the
involving parties, always account being taken of each state's specific characteristics,
development strategies and needs.276 Only a common approach would deliver an IIA
regime characterized by stability, clarity and predictability277 which would help achieve
an appropriate balance in investment relations and would promote the interests of all
stakeholders. 
270 See for example Annex IV of the 2004 Canadian Model BIT.
271 See for instance Article 6.12(4) of the 2005 India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement.
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Conclusions
This  thesis  has  ventured  to  depict  the  right  of  states  to  regulate  in  the  current
international investment law regime. It has indicated that states in the context of their
sovereign powers have the right to determine their own social, political and economic
order and take the measures necessary to promote legitimate public welfare objectives
such as health, safety and the environment. This, however, comes in sharp contrast to
the foreign investors' interests in preserving the favorable legal and political framework
of the host state where they chose to invest and maintain stability and predictability of
investment conditions. In this respect, a notable trend has emerged in more recent
IIAs,  mostly  BITs,  towards  seeking  an appropriate  balance between the contracting
parties' conflicting interests. To this end, a significant effort has been made with a view
to draw the line  between indirect  expropriations requiring compensation and non-
compensable regulatory measures adopted by states in pursuance of their supreme
public welfare interests. Indeed, this thesis has analyzed a series of indicative factors
appearing  in  more  recent  BITs,  as  well  as  in  arbitral  practice,  which  may  assist  in
determining  whether  an  indirect  expropriation  has  occurred  and  thus  whether
compensation  is  due.  Particular  emphasis  has  been put  on  the  host  states'  police
powers, a doctrine inserting an exception to the general rule that compensation must
be paid for expropriation where the regulatory measures imposed relate to specific,
sensitive sectors, i.e  public order and morality, protection of human health and the
environment  and  state  taxation.  In  fact,  it  is  an  important  development  that  the
presence of  this  doctrine has  become quite  more apparent  in current  BITs.  Recent
practice  has  also  shown  an  inclination  towards  applying  a  proportionality  analysis
before  determining  whether  a  measure  amounts  to  indirect  expropriation.  Indeed,
many  tribunals  have  applied  a  “fair  balance  test”278 as  an  important  interpretative
method279 and as the most suitable and effective instrument to balance the host states'
public interests with the investors' private interests.280 The thesis ends by stressing the
need to  reform the current  IIA  regime in  order  to  achieve an appropriate  balance
between  regulatory  space  and  investor  protection,  together  with  some
278 Mouyal, supra n. 3, p. 228.
279 Ranjan, supra n. 170, p. 883.
280 Kulick, supra n. 14, p. 343.
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recommendations in this regard, taking into account UNCTAD's recent initiatives in this
context as well. 
A careful look at the evolution of IIAs makes clear that what began as a moderate trend
towards  achieving  a  more  balanced  investment  system,  has  turned  into  a  strong,
passionate and continuing effort which becomes apparent in several  different ways.
Recent IIAs, such as CETA, TPPA, EU-Vietnam and EU-Singapore FTAs, US, Canadian and
Norway (draft) Model BITs, as well as the currently negotiated TTIP and many more, are
examples  of  treaties  that  have  made  significant  steps  in  this  direction.  The
incorporation of the police powers doctrine in the substantive parts of the treaties, the
use of positive language both in treaties' preambles and their main text, the drafting of
explicit  exceptions  for  the  protection  of  specific  sectors  or  subject  matters,  the
clarifications of vaguely formulated standards of treatment such as the FET standard or
the expropriation rules, as well as the more careful drafted ISDS provisions, are some of
the  innovations  introduced by  these  treaties  with  the  aim to  safeguard  regulatory
space for the pursuance of host states' public policies. These innovations indicate an
overall  more  balanced  approach  followed  by  modern  IIAs,  diverging  from  the
traditional  approach  which  focused  almost  entirely  on  investment  promotion  and
protection. 
More importantly, these innovations have led to a reconsideration of the nature of the
right to regulate as “a basic attribute of sovereignty under international law”,281 and not
as  something  which  has  to  be  especially  granted under  trade  and  investment
agreements.  The  recognition  of  the  right  to  regulate  as  a  right  inherent  in  the
sovereignty of states must be the starting point in every IIA282 and must constitute the
basis  on  which  all  investment  relationships  are  built.  Indeed,  modern  IIAs  tend to
reflect this principle both in their preambles and in their  substantive parts,  leaving
little, or no space for doubts in this regard, thus marking the beginning of a new era in
the world of foreign investments.
Nevertheless, this remarkable move towards a more balanced investment law regime
will  remain empty words without a unified approach at all  levels,  so as to prevent
further  fragmentation,  inconsistency  and  controversy.  In  fact,  this  might  be  the
281 Mann, supra n. 5, p. 216.
282 Ibid, p. 219.
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appropriate time to build “a common framework for global investment cooperation”283
which could help create an IIA regime characterized by uniformity, consistency, stability
and  predictability.  UNCTAD  stands  ready  to  provide  the  necessary  support  and
guidance  in  this  regard.284 This  coordinated  activity  could  even  contribute  to  the
conclusion in the future of a -so much desired but so far failed- multilateral investment
treaty, or at least set the foundations for such a treaty.
Against this new trend, some concerns have already been expressed that the move
towards  enhancing  the  right  of  states  to  regulate  through  IIA  reform,  will  deprive
treaties of their original purpose, namely investment protection, and will lead back to
the same state of “normlessness” that prevailed prior to the conclusion of investment
treaties.285 I  tend to  find these  views  somehow pessimistic  and  conservative.  Such
innovations should be welcomed rather than feared. From my point of view, I do not
see how a collective action aiming at a careful  reform of IIAs, according to specific
design criteria and each state's particular development needs, followed by a proper
interpretation, could be proved detrimental to the foreign investors' interests. The aim
of these reforms is not to deprive foreign investors of the substantive protection they
enjoy in the respective host state, but to pave the way for the rule of law and manage
an equilibrium between the investors' and states' conflicting interests for the benefit of
all.  Besides, no evidence have emerged until now that the inclusion of the right to
regulate  in  IIAs  translates  to  a  reduced  level  of  investment  protection286 against
discriminatory or abusive government conduct.
On the whole, what can be assumed with a reasonable degree of certainty is that the
international investment landscape as we know it, is changing. Countries are turning
slowly but decisively to a new generation of IIAs paying particular emphasis on the
right of states to regulate as a right inherent in the state sovereignty,  while creating or
preserving  an  attractive  investment  climate,  ultimately  balancing  investment
protection  with  regulation  and  putting  an  end  to  the  “old  tradition  of  assymetric
investment protection”.287 In any case, no conclusions can be drawn with any finality
yet. International investment law is in a constant state of flux and we just have to wait
283 UNCTAD, supra n. 207, p. 213.
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and see the results of this remarkable effort in the future.
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• El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
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• Factory at Chorzόw (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13).
• Joseph  Charles  Lemire  v.  Ukraine, ICSID  Case  No.  ARB/06/18,  (Decision  On
Jurisdiction And Liability 14 January 2010).
• LG & E v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case Nº ARB/02/1, (Decision on Liability
3 October 2006).
• Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, (Award 16 December
2002).
• Metalclad  Corporation  v.  The  United  Mexican  States,  ICSID Case  No.
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Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, (Award 12 April 2002).
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7 July 1998).
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Appendix 2
Table of Treaties and Agreements
Bilateral Investment Treaties
Czech Republic Hungary 1993
Germany Argentina 1991
Germany Pakistan 1959
Indonesia Bulgaria 2003 (terminated in 2015)
Indonesia China 1994 (terminated in 2015)
Indonesia France 1973 (terminated in 2015)
Indonesia Italy 1991 (terminated in 2015)
Indonesia The  Lao  People's  Democratic  Republic
1994 (terminated in 2015)
Indonesia Malaysia 1994 (terminated in 2015)
Indonesia The  Netherlands  1994  (terminated  in
2015)
Indonesia Slovakia 1994 (terminated in 2015)
United States Rwanda 2008
Other International Investment Agreements
• ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement 2009
• Australia - Chile Free Trade Agreement 2008
• European Union - Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 2016
• European Union - Singapore Free Trade Agreement 2015
• European Union - Vietnam Free Trade Agreement 2016
• India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement 2005
• Multilateral Agreement on Investment (withdrawn in 1998)
• North American Free Trade Agreement 1992
• Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (currently under negotiation)
• Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 2016
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• United States - Chile Free Trade Agreement 2003
Model Bilateral Investment Treaties
• Canadian Model BIT 2004
• Norway's Draft Model BIT 2015
• US Model BIT 2004
• US Model BIT 2012
Other International Agreements
• Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001 
• Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, UNGA resolution 3281 (XXIX)
1974
• Convention establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 1985
• Convention for  the Protection of  Human Rights  and Fundamental  Freedoms
1950
• Energy Charter Treaty 1994
• Harvard  Draft  Convention  on the International Responsibility of States for
Injuries to Aliens 1961
• Restatement Third of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 1987
• Treaty  of  Lisbon  amending  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  and  the  Treaty
establishing the European Community 2009
• Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969
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